The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency added CVE-2026-90436, an Apache Axis remote code execution vulnerability, to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on November 18, 2026. That listing elevates patch priority for organizations still running Axis 1.x or applications that expose its SOAP functionality. One consequential downstream example is self-hosted Confluence Data Center, but Atlassian says its exposure depends on a specific legacy setting.

What changed

Apache Axis 1.x is an older Java framework for XML-based web services. The vulnerability concerns processing of an inbound SOAP fault: attacker-controlled fault data can influence class selection and instantiation. The Apache disclosure describes this as remote code execution under the right classpath conditions. CISA's exploited-vulnerability listing means defenders should treat the issue as an observed threat, not merely a theoretical code path. The catalog entry does not, by itself, identify every affected application or say that every installation is reachable from the internet.

Axis is often present as a dependency inside another product, so an inventory of only standalone Axis servers will miss some exposure. Atlassian's advisory provides a useful example of the distinction between a vulnerable dependency and an exploitable configuration. Confluence Data Center uses Axis for its old XML-RPC and SOAP Remote API. Atlassian states that an instance must have Remote API (XML-RPC & SOAP) enabled to be vulnerable through this route. The option was disabled by default for new installations beginning with Confluence 3.0, and the feature was removed in Confluence 10.0.

Which Confluence deployments need attention?

Atlassian lists Confluence Data Center versions 1.x through 9.x as affected when the legacy Remote API is enabled. It identifies 9.2.28 as a fixed version and advises moving to the latest supported release or an applicable fixed long-term-support release. Version 10.x is not affected because it no longer contains the legacy feature. Atlassian also says Confluence Cloud sites are not affected by this issue. Administrators should evaluate actual configuration as well as version; seeing an old version number alone does not establish that the SOAP endpoint is enabled.

DeploymentAxis exposure described by AtlassianPriority action
Confluence Data Center 1.x-9.x with Remote API enabledPotentially exposed through the XML-RPC/SOAP featurePatch promptly; disable the feature while arranging the update
Confluence Data Center 1.x-9.x with Remote API disabledThe Atlassian-described route is not enabledVerify the setting and still plan the supported update
Confluence Data Center 10.xLegacy Remote API removedConfirm version and maintain normal patching
Atlassian CloudNot affected according to AtlassianNo action for this Confluence issue

A practical response sequence

Start with an inventory of Confluence Data Center servers, their running versions, and whether the legacy Remote API is enabled. Include private or partner-facing instances: an attacker does not need general public reachability if they have a route to the SOAP endpoint from another network. Identify other applications packaging Axis 1.x separately; Atlassian's fixed-version guidance applies to Confluence, not to every Axis consumer.

For Confluence, update to a fixed supported release. Where a maintenance window is not immediately available, Atlassian's mitigation is to clear the Remote API (XML-RPC & SOAP) checkbox under General Configuration, then Further Configuration. Its advisory notes that scripts, automations, or add-ons relying on the old API may stop working. Test those dependencies and record the change so the emergency mitigation is not quietly reversed.

After disabling the feature, Atlassian says a request to /plugins/servlet/soap-axis1/confluenceservice-v2 should return HTTP 403 Forbidden. A response describing the AXIS service or confluenceservice-v2 means administrators should recheck the setting. This is a configuration check, not a substitute for installing a fixed release. Perform it only against servers you administer, from a network location that can reach the application.

What defenders can and cannot conclude

CISA's listing establishes that exploitation of the CVE has been reported to its catalog process. It does not prove compromise of a particular organization's servers. Atlassian explicitly says it cannot confirm whether customer instances have been affected and recommends local investigation. Teams should preserve relevant application, reverse-proxy, and network logs before changing a suspected system, then review access to the legacy SOAP servlet and any unusual activity around the time of exposure. A normal health check or a single request to the endpoint is not evidence of exploitation; correlate findings with identity, timing, and server behavior.

Atlassian assigns its Confluence-specific scenario a 9.3 CVSS v4 score. That rating is its assessment of this product integration, not a universal rating for all software embedding Axis. The distinction matters because the broader Axis issue and the Confluence configuration have different deployment assumptions. Publishable guidance is therefore conditional: prioritize the exploited dependency, determine whether the application exposes it, apply the vendor's fixed build, and verify any temporary configuration change.

Questions to close before declaring the issue contained

  • Which self-hosted applications still package or expose Apache Axis 1.x?
  • For each Confluence Data Center instance, is the legacy Remote API enabled?
  • Has the server reached a fixed supported version, or is the mitigation still carrying the risk?
  • Did the SOAP endpoint return 403 after mitigation from every relevant network path?
  • Have logs and incident-response teams reviewed systems that were exposed before the change?

Those answers are more useful than treating the CVE identifier as a blanket verdict on every Confluence installation. The CISA catalog and the product advisory together establish the urgency and the conditions under which the named application is exposed.